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Limiting Expert Testimony about Sexual
Harassment Policies
Jayesh Shaht

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits expert
witnesses to give testimony about "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge [if it] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."1 This Rule
balances the broad range of permissible expert testimony with a
requirement that it be both relevant and reliable.2 Trial judges
act as gatekeepers in enforcing Rule 702.
In sexual harassment actions based on claims of a hostile
work environment, the tension between liberal admissibility and
concerns about unreliability and confusion can be dramatic. Current law provides the affirmative defense that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct the supervisor's harassment.' To evaluate the viability of such a defense, prudent
parties hire experts to evaluate the employer's sexual harassment
policy, its method for disseminating the policy, and its conduct of
an internal investigation. This defense raises important practical
and theoretical questions. First, is an expert's evaluation reliable
and relevant?' Second, is such testimony confusing?' Third, what
guidelines might allow the court to limit the scope of the expert's
testimony?6
Federal courts have not adequately addressed these issues. Although in a few cases district courts have excluded this
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I FRE 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
2 Daubertv Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc, 509 US 579, 589 (1993).
Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragherv City of
Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2293 (1998).
' See Part II C 1.
' See Part II C 2.
6 See Part IV A.

587

588

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:

type of testimony,7 courts more often permit experts to testify at
trial.' For litigants, attempting to introduce favorable expert testimony may simply be part of trying a sexual harassment case.9
But to perform its gatekeeping function, the trial court must consider how the proposed evidence assists the trier of fact in analyzing factual and legal issues in a hostile work environment
claim.
This Comment argues that courts should narrowly admit expert testimony regarding harassment policies and investigations.
The 1998 Supreme Court decisions in BurlingtonIndustries,Inc v
Ellerth'° and Faragherv City of Boca Raton" have significantly
altered the structure of sexual harassment litigation. By
grounding liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment on the
reasonableness of both the employer and the employee,12 the
Court has enhanced the importance of factual inquiry and of jury
determinations in establishing and policing the boundaries of Title VII liability. 3 In determining whether an employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and remedy sexual harassment, the
trier of fact will rely primarily on simple threshold questions that
a jury can understand without the aid of an expert. A jury can
also resolve more difficult factual questions, such as the adequacy
of an employer's investigation, without an expert. Overuse of expert testimony in these cases undermines Title VII's purpose of
eliminating discrimination and instead tries to reward the party
with the most impressive experts.
7 Perkins v General Motors Corp, 129 FRD 655, 667 (W D Mo 1990) (refusing to
qualify plaintiff's expert on issue of whether defendant failed to take "specific steps... to
create an environment free from sexual harassment"); see also Lipsett v University of
Puerto Rico, 740 F Supp 921, 924-25 (D PR 1990) (refusing to qualify same expert on a
number of issues related to sexual harassment).
8 See, for example, Sealy v Gruntal & Co, 1998 WL 698257, *3 (S D NY) (noting that
expert's report "offers opinions about the adequacy of [employer's] Equal Employment
Opportunity statement and sexual harassment policy"); Ferriso v The Conway Organization, 1995 WL 580197, *2-3 (S D NY) (affirming magistrate judge's order limiting expert's
testimony to adequacy and effect of employer's harassment policies on employee).
' William G. Mulligan, et al, Expert Witnesses: Direct and Cross-Examination,
§ 23.14 at 350 (Wiley & Sons Supp 1997) ("To argue employer liability, it is... advisable
for the expert to testify on the adequacy of any sexual harassment policy in place at the
time of the harassment.").
10 118 S Ct 2257 (1998).
118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293.
13 Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 21-22 (1993) (adopting "reasonable
person" standard for determining whether harassment "is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and an abusive working environment")
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National
Origin, Age or Disability, 58 Fed Reg 51266, 51267 (1993).
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Part I of this Comment describes how courts evaluate and
limit certain non-scientific expert testimony based on unreliability, lack of fit, and providing legal conclusions. Part II evaluates
the rise of expert testimony about employer responses to sexual
harassment, and some courts' attempts to limit or exclude such
testimony. Part III addresses the recently created affirmative
defense in hostile work environment cases, and explains why this
defense should preclude much current expert testimony regarding employer reasonableness. Finally, Part IV argues that courts
should sharply limit the scope of expert testimony as to employer
reasonableness based upon public policy concerns centering on
the role of the jury and Title VII's objectives.
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

Rule 702's broad scope of potentially admissible expert testimony is consistent with long-standing judicial practice. Dean
Wigmore described the test for whether a skilled witness could
render an opinion as follows: "On this subject can a jury from this
person receive appreciable help?"14 Rule 702's requirement that
expert testimony "assist the trier of fact" reflects this test.' 5 The
drafters of Rule 702 recognized that an expert gives the jury crucial facts or assists them in drawing inferences that it needs to
reach the correct verdict. 6 In deciding whether expert testimony
assists the jury, courts analyze the testimony's reliability, its
methodological fit to the facts of the case, and the factual basis
for its conclusions.
A. Reliability
Despite the general tendency toward liberal admissibility,
courts have expressed concern that some expert testimony may
prove unreliable and mislead or confuse the jury. The Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia voiced this concern in the
landmark 1923 case of Frye v United States. 7 The criminal defendant Frye unsuccessfully tried to introduce as proof of his innocence the results of a "systolic blood pressure deception test" "

James H. Chadbourn, ed, 7 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1923 at

29 (Little, Brown 1978).
" FRE 702.
FRE 702 Advisory Committee Notes ("An intelligent evaluation of facts is often
difficult or impossible without the application of some scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.").
293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923).
17
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an early form of lie detector test. s The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's exclusion of the test results. 9 Acknowledging the
difficulty of differentiating "experimental" from "demonstrable"
scientific testimony,"0 the court formulated the following test: in
order for scientific testimony to be admissible, the theory must
have gained "general acceptance" in its field.2 '
According to many courts and commentators, the so-called
Frye test was too stringent to balance the probative value of expert testimony with the possibility of confusion.2" Frye's validity
came into further doubt following the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence." The Supreme Court took up these issues in
Daubert v Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc,24 in which it rejected the Frye rule.25 Daubert held that the Rules of Evidence
required a more "flexible" inquiry into admissibility than the
"general acceptance" test.2"
Like Frye, the Daubert decision expressed concern about the
reliability of expert testimony. It indicated that trial judges
must perform a "gatekeeping role"' and exclude unreliable or
irrelevant testimony.29 Daubert established a four-factor test that
federal judges must use when evaluating purportedly scientific
testimony: (1) whether the theory is testable, (2) whether it has
been subjected to peer review, (3) the known or potential error
rate, and (4) whether the theory has been generally accepted. 0

'

Id at 1013.

19 Id at 1014.
2' Id.
i 293 F at 1014.

See, for example, United States v Downing, 753 F2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir 1985)
(finding Frye test to be "too malleable ... for orderly and uniform decision-making"); Bert
Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 Fordham L Rev 595, 629 (1988) (arguing
for validity-based approach to admissibility of expert testimony, and calling Frye "the
wrong half of the right approach"); see also Daubert v Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc,
509 US 579, 586 n 4 (1993) (collecting articles).
' See, for example, Downing, 753 F2d at 1237 (Frye "reflects a conservative approach
to the admissibility of scientific evidence that is at odds with the spirit, if not the precise
language, of the Federal Rules of Evidence"); see also Daubert, 509 US at 587 n 5 (collecting cases and articles).
509 US 579 (1993).
Id at 589 (overruling Frye).
Id at 594.
Id at 595 ("Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of
the difficulty in evaluating it."), quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the FederalRules
of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 FRD 631, 632 (1991).
509 US at 597.
Id.

Id at 593-94.

587]

LIMITING EXPERT TESTIMONY

Daubert did not indicate, however, whether and to what extent
these factors may be applied to non-scientific testimony. 1
Lower courts disagreed about the applicability of the Daubert
factors to non-scientific testimony. Several circuits held that the
32
Daubert factors are inconsistent with non-scientific testimony.

Other circuits disagreed and applied Daubertfactors in excluding
non-scientific testimony.33 Another circuit declared that the Daubert factors were relevant to all expert testimony,34 particularly
that involving the quantitative social sciences.35 Some commentators suggested that courts evaluating the reliability of nonscientific testimony should not apply Daubert, but instead con3
sider a return to the Frye test.

The Supreme Court addressed the controversy about non37 The
scientific testimony in Kumho Tire Co, Ltd v Carmichael.
trial court in Kumho excluded the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, a tire analyst, because the expert's methodology for analyzing tire failure failed to satisfy any of the Daubert factors of reliability.38 The trial court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
Daubertis inapplicable to expert testimony presented as "technical analysis" rather than "scientific evidence."39 The Eleventh
" Id at 590 n 8 ("Our discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the
nature of the expertise offered here.").
' See Carmichael v Samyang Tire, Inc, 131 F3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir 1997) (Daubert
factors inapplicable to testimony based on experience rather than scientific methodology),
revd as Kumho Tire Co, Ltd v Carmichael, 119 S Ct 1167 (1999); McKendall v Crown
Control Corp, 122 F3d 803, 806 (9th Cir 1997) (same); Compton v Subaru of America, 82
F3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir 1996) (same).
' See Watkins v Telsmith, Inc, 121 F3d 984, 992-93 (5th Cir 1997) (excluding experience-based engineering testimony as to defects in product design); Peitzmeier v Hennessy
Industries,Inc, 97 F3d 293, 297-98 (8th Cir 1996) (same).
' See Tyus v Urban Search Management, 102 F3d -56, 263-64 (7th Cir 1996) (holding Daubert factors applicable, although not always determinative, in evaluating testimony based on experience or training).
See People Who Care v Rockford Board of Education, 111 F3d 528, 534 (7th Cir
1997).
' Peter B. Oh, The Proper Test for Assessing the Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert
Evidence Under FederalRule of Evidence 702, 45 Cleve St L Rev 437, 466 (1997) (recommending a return to Frye's general acceptance test); Kristina L. Needham, Questioning the
Admissibility of Nonscientific Testimony After Daubert: The Need for Increased Judicial
Gatekeeping to Ensure the Reliability of All Expert Testimony, 25 Fordham Urban L J 541,
570-72 (1998) (recommending "general acceptance" of expert's reasoning, with expert also
able to show reliability by preponderance of evidence); see generally Stephen D. Easton,
"Yer Outta Here!"A Framework for Analyzing the PotentialExclusion of Expert Testimony
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 32 U Richmond L Rev 1, 18 (1998) (listing twenty
questions judges should ask expert, with any negative answers suggesting exclusion or
limitation of testimony).
3 119 S Ct 1167 (1999).
Carmichaelv Samyang Tires, Inc, 923 F Supp 1514, 1522 (S D Ala 1996).
Id at 1521-22.
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Circuit disagreed, finding the Daubert reliability factors inapplicable to this testimony because the expert relied on "his experience in analyzing failed tires," not on scientific principles like
physics and chemistry.40
Reversing the Eleventh Circuit, a unanimous Supreme Court
held that "Daubert'sgeneral principles apply" to all expert testimony,4 and that the trial court has the discretion to apply Daubert factors when evaluating experienced-based testimony.42 The
Court noted both the difficulty and undesirability of maintaining
a bright-line distinction between "'scientific'.

.

. and 'technical' or

'other specialized' knowledge."" The Court noted that Daubert
was never meant to constitute "a definitive checklist or test,"'
and that Daubert factors such as error rate and general acceptance45may be helpful even for testimony based purely on experience.

The Kumho decision thus directs trial courts to evaluate the
quality of the expert testimony, not draw categorical distinctions
between science and other areas of expertise. For example, courts
may continue to permit both beekeepers and aeronautical engineers to testify as expert witnesses regarding bumblebee flight.4
Because trial judges must scrutinize both types of expert testi-

Carmichael, 131 F3d at 1435.
Kumho, 119 S Ct at 1175.
SId at 1176.
Id at 1174, quoting FRE 702.
119 S Ct at 1175, quoting Daubert, 509 US at 593.
119 S Ct at 1176 (noting that a trial court could ask "a witness whose expertise is
based purely on expertise, say, a perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 different
odors at a sniff, whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would recognize as acceptable").
" See Kumho, 119 S Ct at 1178 ("[N]o one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience."). The
example comes from Berry v City of Detroit, 25 F3d 1342 (6th Cir 1994), in which the Sixth
Circuit contrasted the testimony of beekeepers and aeronautical engineers as follows:
"

[I]f one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able to fly, an
aeronautical engineer might be a helpful witness. Since flight principles
have some universality, the expert could apply general principles to the
case of the bumblebee ....
On the other hand, if one wanted to prove that
bumblebees always take off into the wind, a beekeeper with no scientific
training at all would be an acceptable expert witness if a proper foundation were laid for his conclusions. The foundation would not relate to his
formal training, but to his firsthand observations. . . . [T]he beekeeper
does not know any more about flight principles than the jurors, but he
has seen a lot more bumblebees than they have.

Id at 1349-50.
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mony, they thus may exclude both scientific and non-scientific
expertise that fails to satisfy the Daubert reliability factors.47
B. "Fit" of Expert Testimony to the Facts
Apart from reliability, courts have looked to whether an expert's conclusions fit an important issue in the case. Daubert
quoted. from a Third Circuit opinion setting forth as a test
"whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently
tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a
factual dispute."' Although it is similar to relevance, "fit" specifically requires that the expert's method be appropriate for analyzing the issue in dispute.49 Like the "assistance" requirement of
Rule 702, "fit" makes admissibility dependent on how well the
expert testimony explains the unique facts of a particular case."0
For example, when an expert simulates a crash but fails to replicate key features such as velocity and height, the expert's testimony fails the fit test because it fails to address key facts of the
51
case.
Given the broad discretion that district courts have in assessing the reliability of non-scientific testimony, 2 fit may be as
important as reliability in judicial gatekeeping. In one case, a tax
evasion defendant tried to introduce expert testimony that being
a minister's wife was inconsistent with independently reviewing
the accuracy of a joint tax return. 3 The court properly excluded
this testimony, because the expert's description of a minister's
wife's duties did not bear on whether the defendant could file an
accurate tax return. 4 Even though the expert may have testified
" Kumho, 119 S Ct at 1179 (Scalia concurring) ("[T]rial-court discretion in choosing
the manner of testing expert reliability... is discretion to choose among reasonablemeans
of excluding expertise that is fausse and science that is junky.").
Daubert, 509 US 579, 591 (1993), quoting United States v Downing, 753 F2d 1224,
1242 (3d Cir 1985).
' See In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F3d 717, 743 (3d Cir 1994)
([A]nimal studies may be methodologically acceptable to show that chemical X increases
the risk of cancer in animals, but they may not be methodologically acceptable to show
that chemical X increases the risk of cancer in humans."); Daubert,509 US at 591 ("scien-

tific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes").
o See General Electric Co v Joiner, 118 S Ct 512, 523 (1997) (Stevens dissenting)
(Daubertand Federal Rules of Evidence focus on whether "an expert's conclusions... fit
the facts of the case and are based on reliable scientific methodology").
51
See Habecker v Clark Equipment Co, 36 F3d 278, 289-90 (3d Cir 1994) (citing
numerous differences between actual fall of forklift and expert's simulation thereof).
See notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
United States v Lilly, 37 F3d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir 1994).
Id.
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reliably about the duties of a minister's wife, her testimony did
not assist the trier of fact in determining criminal intent. An expert's testimony must be based on a reliable methodology, which
cannot ignore important facts at issue in the case.
C. Expert Opinions on Ultimate Issues
Courts place another limitation on expert testimony by requiring that opinions on ultimate issues be supported by a factual
basis.55 By generally allowing experts to testify on ultimate issues, Rule 704 reverses an old common law prohibition.5" The
former rule was based on the belief that an expert who testifies,
for example, that the defendant's drug caused plaintiffs injury,
"usurp[s] the province of the jury."5 7 In practice, under the old
rule experts gave substantially the same testimony, and merely
couched their conclusions in "odd verbal circumlocutions." 8 Rule
704 acknowledges the futility of this exercise and permits opinions on ultimate issues when a series of opinions leads to the conclusion. The Federal Rules currently prohibit experts only from
making legal conclusions.59
1. DemonstratingFactualCharacteristics.
Rule 704 permits opinions as to ultimate factual issues only
when the testimony satisfies the relevance and reliability requirements of Rule 702.0 Because expert testimony must assist
the trier of fact, a bare conclusion such as "Smith was intoxicated," without evidentiary support, is likely inadmissible." But
See Mid-State Fertilizer Co v Exchange National Bank, 877 F2d 1333, 1339 (7th
Cir 1989) ("An 'opinion has a significance proportioned to the sources that sustain it.' An
expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies nothing of value to the judicial
process."), quoting Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v National City
Bank, 170 NE 479, 483 (NY 1930).

FRE 704 ("Except as provided in subsection (b) [regarding the mental state of a
criminal defendant], testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible
is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact."); see also FRE 704 Advisory Committee Notes ("[T]he so-called 'ultimate issue' rule
is specifically abolished by the instant rule.").
57 FRE 704 Advisory Committee Notes, citing John Henry Wigmore, 7 Evidence in
Trials at Common Law § 1923 at 17 (Little, Brown 1940).

FRE 704 Advisory Committee Notes.

Id (distinguishing factual conclusions such as insanity, medical causation, and

"intoxication, speed, handwriting, and value" from "inadequately explored legal criteria"
such as "capacity to make a will").

' FRE 704 Advisory Committee Notes ("Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must
still be helpful to the trier of fact.").
" See McMahon v Bunn-O-Matic Corp, 150 F3d 651,657-58 (7th Cir 1998) (rejecting
expert testimony that "offer[ed] only a bare conclusion" that high-temperature coffee damages "the structural integrity of the styrofoam cup into which the coffee was poured");
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the result is different when the expert supports his conclusion
with factual information. A better formulation would be: "Smith
had been drinking and was unable to control motor functions, and
was therefore intoxicated." Here the expert's opinion completes
the picture for the jury, assisting them without telling them
whether Smith satisfied a legal standard. 2
2. DemonstratingLegal Standardsof Care.
When the expert's ultimate conclusion concerns the appropriate level of care, expert testimony may usurp the judge's
rather than the jury's function. Experts are never permitted to
make legal conclusions, or testify about what the law is.' Even
though expert testimony that a party is negligent might assist
the jury, statements of what the law is fall within "the special
legal knowledge of the judge.'
When an expert witness attempts to testify that a party
acted "reasonably" or exercised "due care," the opinion must be
based upon facts. A purely conclusory statement invades the
judge's province to define the law for the jury." Further, if the
opinion fails to supply a concrete standard for judging conduct,
the testimony proves unhelpful to the jury." However, industryspecific customs provide a benchmark that, while not determinative, provides a point of departure for credibility determinations.
Consider a hypothetical case in which Allen, a tax lawyer,
testifies in a malpractice trial of Baker, another tax lawyer. Allen
testifies that Baker failed to exercise reasonable professional
judgment by giving his client erroneous advice about the impact
of a new tax law. Under Rule 702, Allen's testimony about how
tax lawyers learn the law and advise their clients assists the jury.
Tabatchnik v G. D. Searle & Co, 67 FRD 49, 55 (D NJ 1975) (FRE 704 does not "allow[ ] a
bare conclusion which lacks supporting data and rationale leading to that conclusion. The
sole justification and purpose of expert testimony is to assist the trier of fact to find a solid
path through an unfamiliar and esoteric field.").
' See FRE 704 Advisory Committee Notes ("[T]he question, 'Did T have capacity to
make a will?' would be excluded, while the question, 'Did T have sufficient mental capacity
to know the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and to
formulate a rational scheme of distribution?' would be allowed.").
' See, for example, United States v Scop, 846 F2d 135, 140 (2d Cir 1988) (holding

that securities expert's testimony describing defendant's "manipulation" and "fraud" consisted of impermissible legal conclusions).

Chadbourn, ed, 7 Wigmore § 1952 at 103 (cited in note 14).
Marx & Co v Diner's Club, Inc, 550 F2d 505, 509-10 (2d Cir 1977) ("It is not for

witnesses to instruct the jury as to applicable principles of law, but for the judge.").
I See Minasian v StandardCharteredBank, PLC, 109 F3d 1212, 1216 (7th Cir 1997)
(rejecting expert's conclusion that transaction was "not 'commercially reasonable"' as
"legal analysis in the guise of banking expertise," especially when based on "economically
ludicrous" assumptions).
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Allen also identifies for the jury Baker's deviation from the professional standard. Because Allen and Baker are both tax lawyers, the jury can evaluate the competing claims, believe or disbelieve Allen's testimony, and determine whether Baker met professional standards. 7
When no custom or professional standard exists to guide the
standard of care, expert testimony may make conclusions of law
and mislead a jury. In one case, an expert testified that a deaf
plaintiff was denied "as effective" communication under the
Americans With Disabilities Act, because the police officer taking
the plaintiff's statement did not use a deaf interpreter." However, regulations required that the meaning of "as effective" be
determined "contextual[ly]," rather than "on an absolute scale."6 9
Because the expert made no effort to identify for the jury the
relevant contextual facts, the Court of Appeals held that his testimony constituted an impermissible legal conclusion. 70 Especially
where no industry custom exists, relevant context is necessary to
support an expert's opinion as to an ultimate issue.
Judges screen scientific and non-scientific expert testimony
based on whether the testimony contributes to an issue of significance in the case. Principles such as reliability, fit, and the prohibition on legal conclusions eliminate testimony that adversely
affects the jury's ability to apply the relevant facts to the law. In
the case of non-scientific testimony, context is especially important in the expert's opinion to prevent confusing the jury with
quasi-legal standards that are not relevant to the ultimate issue.
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
Although expert testimony is not required to sustain a hostile
workplace environment sexual harassment claim, 71 parties frequently use expert witnesses to strengthen the merits of their
cases. 71 Such expert opinion includes psychological and medical
See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and The Structure of Negligence
Law, 67 Fordham L Rev 649, 678-79 (1998).
Burkhart v Washington Metro TransportationAuthority, 112 F3d 1207, 1213 (DC
Cir 1997).
Id, citing 28 CFR § 35.160(a) (1996).
70 Id at 1213 (reversing the trial court's admission of this testimony).
71 See Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 21 (1993) (adopting "reasonable
person" standard for hostile environment claims).
' See John V. Vansonius and Andrew M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment
Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing Admissibility, 50 Baylor L Rev 267, 268
(1998) (noting difficulty of obtaining direct evidence and ambiguity of circumstantial evidence in employment discrimination cases).
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testimony about causation and emotional distress damages,73 and
cultural and behavioral testimony explaining a complainant's
failure to report sexual harassment.74 Lower courts have favored
including expert testimony in sexual harassment cases. 75 The Supreme Court has evaluated expert testimony in only one sex discrimination case, when a plurality found superfluous an expert's
conclusions about sexual stereotyping.7" Although the Court's
analysis focused on assistance to the trier of fact rather than reliability,77 the dissent suggested that the expert testimony lacked
reliability.7
Lower courts have expressed similar concerns with expert
testimony about harassment policies and investigative procedures. Courts have linked the adequacy of harassment policies to
an employer's liability and, in some cases, to a victim's duty to
complain. 79 Although initially skeptical toward expert testimony
about harassment policies, 0 trial courts increasingly permitted
presentations are now
such testimony,8 ' and these
commonplace. 2 As several courts have observed, the fundamental
problem with this testimony is that it often conflates the formal
characteristics of an employer's harassment policy with the employer's standard of care in preventing harassment. 3
A. Employer Responses to Sexual Harassment
Federal courts permit experts to testify about a number of
issues concerning the effectiveness of an employer's response to
" See, for example, Jensen v Eveleth Taconite Co, 130 F3d 1287, 1298 (8th Cir 1997)
(finding the testimony of plaintiff's expert regarding causation to be "thorough and meticulously presented*).
' See, for example, Dang Vang v Vang Xiong X Toyed, 944 F2d 476, 481-82 (9th Cir
1991) (expert testimony permitted in § 1983 sexual harassment case involving Hmong
refugees raped by a state official, explaining, inter alia, victims' continuing contact with

the official).
"

Jensen, 130 F3d at 1298 (stating that "[t]he rule clearly 'is one of admissibility

rather than exclusion,'" and criticizing "categorical exclusions" of expert testimony based
on subject matter) (citation omitted).
76 Hopkins v Price Waterhouse, 490 US 228, 256 (1989) (plurality opinion).

Id ("[Wie are tempted to say that [the witness's] expert testimony was merely icing
on [plaintiffs] cake. It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a descrip-

tion of an aggressive female employee as requiring 'a course at charm school.').
7' Id at 293 n 5 (Kennedy dissenting) ("[The expert] purported to discern stereotyping
in comments that were gender neutral.., without any knowledge of the comments' basis
in reality and without having met the speaker or subject.").
See Part II B.
See notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
Si See notes 99-107 and accompanying text.

See notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
See notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
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sexual harassment." First, experts testify about victims' typical
responses to sexual harassment. s5 Extending the scope of this
type of testimony, one court permitted an expert to state whether
an employer's policy "take[s] into account that most victims of
sexual harassment do not come forth." 6 Second, experts testify
about the generally appropriate measures that employers should
take to prevent and correct sexual harassment. 7 Third, experts
testify about what language employers should use in a harassment policy. 8 Fourth, experts testify about the adequacy of an
employer's notification and training of employees pursuant to a
sexual harassment policy. 9
Two doctrinal developments support these categories of
expert testimony. First, the details of an employer's harassment
policy are relevant to determining employer liability.9 ° Second, a

" At least one state court has also addressed the admissibility of expert testimony
about harassment policies and investigations. See Coates v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 976 P2d
999, 1008 (NM 1999) (finding an expert's testimony "regarding the minimum standards
for an effective sexual harassment corporate policy" to be both relevant to refute the employer's defense and helpful to "the jury in understanding the issue"). An analysis of state
court decisions on this subject is outside the scope of this Comment.
' See, for example, Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc, 760 F Supp 1486, 150607 (M D Fla 1991) (common reactions to sexual harassment, including coping
mechanisms); Moffett v Glick, 621 F Supp 244, 262 (N D Ind 1985) (stress effects and
victims' perceptions of employer non-response); Broderick v Ruder, 685 F Supp 1269, 1273
(D DC 1988) (stress effects).
Ferrisov The Conway Organization, 1995 WL 580197, *1 (S D NY).
Jonasson v Lutheran Child & Family Services, 1995 WL 579510, *2 (N D Ill) (permitting expert to testify about "what she considers to be an appropriate management
structure to properly respond to all issues of sexual harassment"); Robinson, 760 F Supp
at 1519 (permitting expert to testify about "the elements of a comprehensive, effective
sexual harassment policy"); see also Perkins v General Motors Corp, 129 FRD 655, 667 (W
D Mo 1990) (quoting another court's qualification of expert regarding "the appropriate
response that employers should make to harassment on the job").
" See, for example, Harperv Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 998 F Supp 1289,
1297 (M D Ala 1998) (expert testifying that a policy must be specifically directed at sexual
harassment and state that employees using grievance procedure would be protected);
Robinson, 760 F Supp at 1519 (expert testifying that a policy must describe behaviors
constituting sexual harassment, note that both coworkers and supervisors can be harassers, and "promise and provide confidentiality and protection from retaliation").
' See, for example, Harper, 998 F Supp at 1297 (expert testifying that an employer
must specify multiple, specific contacts for reporting sexual harassment, post the policy in
addition to including it in employee handbook, and should conduct seminars regarding
policy); Robinson, 760 F Supp at 1519 (expert testifying that a policy must provide "a
number of avenues through which a complaint may be initiated" and that employer must
train supervisors on how to investigate claims of sexual harassment); but see Jones v USA
Petroleum Corp, 20 F Supp 2d 1379, 1386 (S D Ga 1998) (court refusing to require that an
employer must "affirmatively train its employees regarding sexual harassment").
" Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 71 (1986).
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victim's subjective perspective is a necessary element of a hostile
workplace environment claim."
B. Employment Policies and Title VII Liability
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson,92 the Court held that
Title VIIP permits an employee to hold an employer vicariously
liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor. 4 Meritor stated that
a sexual harassment policy would not always defeat the employer's liability, but was "plainly relevant" in two ways.9 First,
an employer might not be found liable if it demonstrates the "existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination." 6 Second, an employer might also prevail when it proves
that a plaintiff "fail[ed] to invoke" the employer's grievance procedure.9 7
Expert witnesses testified about the effectiveness of sexual
harassment policies as early as 1985,"8 often explaining why complainants in general, or even a particular complainant, did not
report incidents of sexual harassment to the employer. The leading case on this issue is Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc,"
in which the plaintiff was one of only a few female craftworkers
employed at the defendant's shipyards.'
The expert witness
stated that typical responses by victims of sexual harassment
range from denying the impact of the incident, to joking with others to "defuse the situation," to actually making a formal complaint.'0 ' According to the expert, making a complaint was the
rarest response, and accordingly, "An effective policy for controlling sexual harassment cannot rely on ad hoc incident-by-incident
reporting and investigation. 0 2

" Harrisv Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 21-22 (1993) (requiring objectively hostile conditions and subjective perception of abusive environment to sustain hostile work
environment claim).
477 US 57 (1986).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-16, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253-66 (1964), codified at 42 USC §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
Meritor, 477 US at 73.
Id at 72.
Id.
Id.
See Moffett v Glick, 621 F Supp 244, 262-63 (N D Ind 1985) (expert testified about
stress effects and victims' perceptions of employer non-response).
"

760 F Supp 1486 (M D Fla 1991).

'0

Id at 1491.

"' Id at 1506.
102

Id.
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The Robinson court relied on this expert testimony in criticizing the language of the policy, °3 defendant's distribution of the
policy," and its response to complaints.0 5 However, the court
devoted a much greater portion of its opinion to recounting numerous incidents of supervisors ignoring and undermining employees' informal complaints about sexual harassment.' The
court recognized the importance of the factual context:
Female employees lacked confidence in the willingness
and commitment of [defendant] to take steps to halt sexually harassing behavior... [and] adopted personal strategies for coping with the work environment. [Plaintiff], for
instance, declined to complain about degrading pictures
and comments because she feared that she might be subjected to retaliation and that the complaints would not be
07
well-received.
By this reasoning, the deficient policy did not cause sexual harassment, but rather failed to minimize the incidence and severity
of harassment, forcing victims to resort to coping methods instead
of filing formal complaints.
Sexual harassment experts reached the same conclusion in
several other cases tried during the late 1980s and early 1990s,
relating the sufficiency of harassment policies to the victim's perception of and response to harassment.' As in Robinson, expert
testimony intertwined employee and employer reasonableness, so
that an unreasonable harassment policy made it unlikely that a
harassment victim would come forward.0 9 After Meritor, if an
employer had a harassment policy, a plaintiff arguably had to
10
760 F Supp at 1510, 1518 (policy failed to name the person to whom victims of
sexual harassment should report grievances, and subsequent policy did not provide an
alternate contact for grievances).
" Id (policy not incorporated into company rule book, not distributed in same manner
as safety policies, many employees and supervisors were unaware of policy, and harassment policy was posted only on bulletin boards).
" Id at 1512 (company did not require that supervisors document harassment complaints).
'"
Id at 1510 (supervisors failed to investigate claims of sexual harassment by other
female employees); id at 1511 (supervisors pressured one victim to "accept an apology as

full settlement of her complaint"); id at 1513-15 (supervisors repeatedly ignored plaintiff's
complaints about presence of pornographic pictures in workplace).

760 F Supp at 1512.
See note 85.
See, for example, Shrout v Black Clawson Co, 689 F Supp 774, 777 (S D Ohio 1988)
(permitting an expert on corporate policies to testify that because of employer's inadequate sexual harassment policy, women reasonably failed to complain about sexual harassment).
'
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defend any delay in coming forward.11° If the plaintiff did not
have a specific psychological justification for delay, a critique of
the policy served as an alternate method for establishing her reasonableness.
C. Separating Victim Perception from Policy Analysis
In Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc,"' the Supreme Court held
that to prevail on a hostile environment claim, a plaintiff must
show objectively hostile conditions and a subjective perception
that the workplace was abusive.' Since the Harrisdecision, most
experts analyzing employer responses to sexual harassment focus
on whether a written policy meets certain textual requirements,
rather than on whether a policy chilled reports of sexual harassment."' Trial courts generally hold this testimony admissible,
although some courts impose limitations on the subject matter.
1. Expert Testimony Regardinga Policy'sAdequacy.
The ultimate issue in most expert testimony about employer
response is whether the harassment policy and investigation are
adequate. "4 Under Rule 704, an expert must provide a factual
basis rather than a bare conclusion to support her opinion on a
policy's adequacy." 5 However, this Rule does not specify how detailed the supporting facts must be, and courts evaluating expert
opinions regarding sexual harassment policies rarely ask for specific supporting evidence."'
Experts' analyses of harassment policies usually focus solely
on the sufficiency of the written documents. In refusing to permit
1'

See Mulligan, et al, Expert Witnesses § 23.20 at 361 (cited in note 9) ("The attitude

of management would also be useful in understanding the reason why a complainant
would not file or process a formal complaint.").
.. 510 US 17 (1993).
1
Id at 21-22.
See Sealy v Gruntal & Co, 1998 WL 698257, *3 (S D NY) (noting that expert witness "inpreparing her report... did not even consult deposition testimony"); Ferrisov The

Conway Organization, 1995 WL 580197, *1 (SD NY) (noting that bulk of expert's report
concerned facial adequacy of harassment policy, not its application).
.

See, for example, Harper v Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 998 F Supp 1289,

1297 (M D Ala 1998) (expert testified that policy was "insufficient" and its dissemination
was "inadequate").
See PartI C 1.
Compare Bonner v Guccione, 1996 WL 512158, *1 (S D NY) (requiring expert to
revise report and explain opinion that employer's "written policy on sexual harassment
was 'deficient in several respects"), with Carriganv Delaware Department of Corrections,

957 F Supp 1376, 1383 (D Del 1997) (granting summary judgment for prison in § 1983
sexual harassment suit by inmate, where plaintiff did not rebut defense expert's opinion
that training, policy, procedures and supervision were 'more than adequate').
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one expert to broaden the scope of her report, a court noted that
the expert was testifying exclusively about the written policy, and
did not even review deposition transcripts.117 Experts' emphasis
on the text of the policy diminishes the policy's relevance to the
day-to-day working environment, an issue critical to the Robinson
decision.' Admitting testimony regarding the adequacy of a
written policy does not mean that the court must also admit expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of the employer's
preventative and remedial measures.
2. Limiting Expert Testimony on Harassment,Policies.
Courts vary widely in their efforts to limit the scope of expert
testimony on employer reasonableness. Several court decisions
predating Robinson rejected this type of expert testimony, finding
that it would usurp either the judge's or jury's role."' In Perkins v
General Motors Corp, 2 ' the district court refused to qualify an
expert to testify about an employer's sexual harassment policy, 2 '
admonishing that "no witness would be permitted to testify about
the law on sexual harassment."122 In Lipsett v University of Puerto
Rico, 2' the district court concluded that expert testimony concerning sexual harassment usurps the jury's province, and therefore excluded the testimony. 24 The Lipsett court held that expert
testimony did not assist the jury on the ultimate issue of whether
the employer had a hostile work environment. 28
n" Sealy v Gruntal & Co, 1998 WL 698257, *3 (S D NY); see also Ferriso v The
Conway Organization, 1995 WL 580197, *1 (S D NY) (noting that bulk of expert's report
concerned facial adequacy of harassment policy, not its application).
.. Compare Ferriso,1995 WL 580197 at *2 (permitting expert testimony on adequacy
and effect of employer's harassment policies on employee, but not on "the typicality of
[employee's] reactions to the alleged harassment"), with Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc, 760 F Supp 1486, 1512 (M D Fla 1991) (plaintiff "declined to complain about
degrading pictures and comments... because she feared that she might be subjected to
retaliation and that the complaints would not be well-received"); see also Mulligan, et al,
Expert Witnesses, § 23.20 at 361 (cited in note 9) ("The expert should point to specific policies or acts by management that fail to properly deal with sexual harassment.").
"' Lipsett v University of Puerto Rico, 740 F Supp 921 (D PR 1990); Perkins v General
Motors Corp, 129 FRD 655, 667 (W D Mo 1990) (same expert witness who later testified in
Robinson).
12

129 FRD 655 (W D Mo 1990).

"' Id at 667.
122
Id (expert attempted to testify on issues such as the definition of sexual harassment and specific steps that the employer could have taken to "create an environment free
from sexual harassment").
'" 740 F Supp 921 (D PR 1990).
124
125

Id at 925.

Id ("[W]e conclude that the proposed experts' testimony in this case would not

bring to the jury anything more than the lawyers can offer in argument.") (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
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District courts have recently proposed different limits on the
admissibility of expert testimony regarding harassment policies
12 6
and investigations. In EEOC v Indiana Bell Telephone Co, Inc,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission proffered testimony by an "employment law educator" 127 on numerous subjects
related to the adequacy of the defendant's sexual harassment
policy." The district court excluded all of this testimony for several reasons. First, the expert intended to testify about "standard
employer practices
and procedures
regarding sexual
harassment," 2 ' but the court found these practices to be neither
standardized nor published in the defendant's industry.3 0 Second,
the court found the expert's proposed discussion of industry standards for harassment policies to be inconsistent with determining
the employer's liability under Title VII.'3 ' Third, the court criticized the generality of the expert's observations
and conclusions,
13 2
and her overall unhelpfulness to the jury.
Other district courts have come to similar conclusions in
trying to limit the scope of expert testimony on this subject. In
Huffman v City of Prairie Village,' both parties attempted to
introduce expert testimony about the employer's harassment
policy, and exclude each other's expert testimony.3 The district
court, noting the conflict between Robinson and Lipsett on the
admissibility of this type of testimony,' refused to exclude either
party's expert. 3 ' Nevertheless, the court declared that it was "not
79 FEP Cases (BNA) 570 (S D Ind 1997).

2

127 Id at 573.
128

Id:

[Expert] will testify as to standard employer practices and procedures regarding sexual harassment and the "comparative adequacy" of Ameritech's policies and procedures; Ameritech's efforts to educate and train
managers about its sexual harassment policies and procedures; whether
Ameritech's responses to complaints of sexual harassment were consistent with standard practices regarding investigation, thoroughness,
commitment, recording, tracking, monitoring, follow-up and training; and

whether DF [sic] complied with its own procedures.
1

Id.

79 FEP Cases at 574 ("No industry groups have adopted her standards, nor have
they even been widely-published.").
...Id ("Courts considering Title VII cases have not routinely allowed a reasonableness
'o

determination based on [ ] industry standards.").
32 Id at 574-75 (because the expert's opinions were based on observing "the aggregate

of conduct," they had "too little connection with the facts of this case to be useful to the
jury, or to overcome the potential prejudicial effect").
3
980 F Supp 1192 (D Kan 1997).

Id at 1207.
13

Id at 1208.

"

Id at 1209.
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enthusiastic about any of the proposed expert testimony,"137 and
might later exclude evidence that did not comport with the
facts.13
In Jonasson v Lutheran Child & Family Services,139 another
case involving a defendant's sexual harassment policy, the court
limited plaintiffs expert testimony to generally appropriate responses by management to prevent and deter harassment. 40 Like
the court in Indiana Bell, the Jonasson court noted that "the test
is not whether the employer could have done more to remedy the
adverse effects."'4 1 This limitation is consistent with Rule 704 and
cases involving standards of care.'
Since the Robinson decision, lower courts have been increasingly willing to admit expert testimony regarding employer harassment policies and investigations. Yet in light of Harrisv Forklift Systems, the need for such testimony is increasingly suspect.
As a few courts have held, employers should not be held liable for
failing to have "the best" policy, but only for failing to have a reasonable policy.4 This argument has added force in light of recent
developments in the standard for employer liability under Title
VII.
III. THE EMPLOYER'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE To LIABILITY
In the companion decisions of Burlington Industries, Inc v
Ellerth,'" and Faragher v City of Boca Raton,'45 the Supreme
Court held that in a hostile work environment suit, an employer
may have an affirmative defense to vicarious liability by having a
sexual harassment policy. 4" To prevail on the affirmative defense, an employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) it exercised "reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and (2) "the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities."'47 The affirmative defense is not avail...980 F Supp at 1209.
13

Id.

'

1995 WL 579510 (N D Ill).

Id at *2.
Compare id with IndianaBell, 79 FEP Cases at 574 ("The proper inquiry, however,
is not what is best, but what is reasonable under the circumstances.').
See Part I C 2.
Indiana Bell, 79 FEP Cases at 574; see also Jonasson, 1995 WL 579510 at *2.
118 S Ct 2257 (1998).
118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
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able, however, if the harassment leads to the employee's "discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.""
Elaborating on the employer's "reasonable care" requirement,
the Court stated that larger employers with "many departments"
and "far-flung locations" must have a formal harassment policy.""
The Court further noted that an employer's policy and implementation of it must be reasonably calculated to prevent and correct
sexual harassment. 5 However, these standards are not the novel
part of Ellerth and Faragher,since lower court decisions as early
as 1983 held employers' harassment policies to a similar standard. 5' The key innovations in Ellerth and Faragherresult from
(1) the focus on specific examples that evince employer reasonableness, and (2) consideration of employer and employee reasonableness separately.
A. Factual Inquiry in Determining Employer Reasonableness
In determining whether an employer has acted reasonably,
the FaragherCourt focused on actions such as creating a policy,
disseminating a policy, keeping track of supervisors' conduct, and
informing employees that they may bypass harassing supervisors
when registering complaints. 52 Lower courts have applied these
findings in determining whether an employer is entitled to prevail on its affirmative defense. 15 To a number of these courts, a
sexual harassment policy is adequate if it satisfies the requirements set forth in Faragher.54
1. Threshold Questions.
The Faragherdecision identified three important characteristics - a policy's existence, its dissemination, and its reporting
"

Elerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293.

Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293 (distinguishing small workforces which might informally prevent and correct harassment, from organizations with "many departments in far-

flung locations," which must "communicat[e] some formal policy against harassment").
150 Id.

...See, for example, Katz v Dole, 709 F2d 251, 256 (4th Cir 1983) (holding that an
employer may "point[ ] to prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment").
Faragherv City of Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2293 (1998).
See notes 162, 185, 200-01. See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Super-.
visors (outlining six elements of an effective complaint procedure, including (1) prohibition
against harassment, (2) protection against retaliation, (3) effective complaint process, (4)
confidentiality, (5) effective investigative process, and (6) assurance of immediate and
appropriate corrective action), available online at <http//www.eeoc.gov/docs/
harassment.html> (visited Oct 1, 1999).
'" See notes 161-62.
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procedures - that help determine whether an employer may
prevail on its affirmative defense in a sexual harassment
lawsuit.155 Several lower courts evaluating these elements determined without the use of expert testimony whether or not the
employer satisfied these requirements.15
The first question courts ask is whether the employer has a
sexual harassment policy. At least one expert has characterized
an employer's harassment policy as nonexistent,1 67 but courts
have not adopted this analysis when applying Ellerth and
156 If the employer has a written policy that discusses
Faragher.
sexual harassment, courts generally accept the policy's existence
without delving into details.
One court concluded that the method for disseminating a
harassment policy, the second element discussed in Faragher,
signifies how seriously the employer wants to deter sexual harassment.5 9 At least one expert has testified about the proper
means of disseminating a harassment policy."e Recent cases considering the affirmative defense adopt a pragmatic perspective
that should preclude such expert testimony. Rather than speculating how employers can distribute a policy, courts now focus on
whether an employee knows that a harassment policy exists and
how to invoke its grievance procedures. 11 Several courts have
addressed this issue at the summary judgment stage,6 2 suggestFaragherv City of Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2293 (1998).
See, for example, Coates v Sundor Brands, Inc, 164 F3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir
1999); Jones v USA Petroleum Corp, 20 F Supp 2d 1379, 1385-86 (S D Ga 1998); Montero
v AGCO Corp, 19 F Supp 2d 1143, 1146) (E D Cal 1998).
117
See Shrout v Black Clawson Co, 689 F Supp 774, 777 (S D Ohio 1988) (expert
stated that "open-door" policy was too broad to qualify as sexual harassment policy).
"
Coates, 164 F3d at 1364 (defendant's "own promulgated sexual harassment policy
clearly specified the steps a victimized employee should take to alert the employer of harassment"); Montero, 19 F Supp 2d 1143, 1146 (E D Cal 1998) (employer "had an antiharassment policy with a complaint procedure").
'" Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc, 760 F Supp 1486, 1510, 1518 (M D Fla
1991) (criticizing employer's failure to distribute harassment policy in employee rule book
or place on Equal Employment Opportunity posters).
" Harper v Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 998 F Supp 1289, 1297 (M D Ala
1998) (expert opined that "any statement addressing sexual harassment should be posted
and widely publicized and distributed among employees periodically").
"' Jones, 20 F Supp 2d at 1386 (granting summary judgment for employer and rejecting argument that it was required to post its harassment policy or give employees a
copy to keep); but see Robinson v Truman College, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 545, *21 (N D Ill)
(granting summary judgment for employer in part because "it has had in place, since
1992, a written sexual harassment policy that is distributed to every full and part-time
employee"); Maddin v GTE of Florida, Inc, 33 F Supp 2d 1027, 1032 (M D Fla 1999)
(granting summary judgment for employer in part because the employer "posted the policy
on employee bulletin boards on every floor of the building in which [plaintiff] worked").
" Jones, 20 F Supp 2d 1386; Robinson v Truman College, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 545 at
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ing that an employer's method of distribution normally does not
raise issues of credibility for the jury.
Despite the low threshold that most courts
have set for
proper dissemination of a harassment policy, employees may not
always be aware of the harassment policy. This is especially true
if a policy is merely an insert in an employee handbook."8 One
can also imagine borderline scenarios, such as an employer distributing its harassment policy in a tiny typeface. Although an
expert might testify that a 3-point font is too small for most people to read, the proper question is whether the jury needs the expert's specialized knowledge to determine whether the policy has
been properly disseminated. 6' In this context, specialized knowledge will almost always be unnecessary. Under Faragher,employers must "communicat[e] some formal policy against harassment," but need not use a specific form of communication.165 Absent an employee unable to understand the terms of a harassment policy, courts can resolve the adequacy of the employer's
communication without expert testimony."'6
The third threshold question is whether a harassment policy
permits an employee to bypass her supervisor when reporting an
incident of sexual harassment.'67 Again, no expert is needed because the presence or absence of a bypass procedure will be obvious on its face. 6 ' Several recent cases focusing on burdens placed
on complainants by an overly complex reporting structure illustrate why expert testimony on this subject does not assist the
trier of fact. In Williamson v City of Houston,69 the plaintiff followed the employer's policy by reporting harassment to an appropriate supervisor, but the harassment did not stop. 7 ' In the subsequent Title VII action, the employer argued that upon receiving
an unsatisfactory response from her supervisor, the plaintiff
" See, for example, Harper,998 F Supp at 1297 (expert stating that "it is inadequate
to merely include sexual harassment policy in an employee handbook"); but see ButtaBrinkman v FCA International, Ltd, 950 F Supp 230, 232 (N D 111 1996) (finding that

plaintiff was aware of defendant's sexual harassment policy, which was "clearly articulated in [defendant's] employee handbook").
1

See notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293.

6

Jones, 20 F Supp 2d at 1385 ("[N]either [employee] claims that they were pre-

vented from reading and understanding what they signed.").
167 Faragher,118 S Ct 2275, 2293 (1998) (requiring "assurance" of bypass in reporting
complaints).
1
Id (record clearly reflected assurance that employees could bypass supervisors in
reporting sexual harassment); Jones, 20 F Supp 2d at 1386 (defendant's harassment policy
supplied "an alternative channel for bypassing errant supervisors").
148 F3d 462 (5th Cir 1998).
176 Id at 463-64.

608

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:

should have contacted another named entity for receiving complaints, the city's affirmative action office.17 The Fifth Circuit
rejected this defense, noting that the employer was attempting to
use its policy "to insulate itself from liability."' Clearly the
problem in Williamson was the supervisor's failure to take plaintiffs complaint seriously, as was the case in Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.7 '
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Wilson v
Tulsa JuniorCollege,'74 when it found that a college's harassment
policy "did not provide an avenue for processing [after-hours]
complaints."17 In this case, the only office responsible for receiving harassment complaints was closed during the evening and on
weekends.17 Late one night, plaintiff reported an incident of sexual harassment to the campus police, but the police failed to inform the university's civil rights office of the complaint.'77 Although the Tenth Circuit found the college liable for its supervisor's harassment of the plaintiff,' two of three judges did not
find the employer's policy inadequate.' 79
Despite criticizing the employers' reporting policies, the
above cases do not establish specific requirements for procedures
to bypass a complainant's supervisor. Clearly both the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits will not tolerate harassment policies that force
plaintiffs to jump from office to office in order to lodge internal
complaints. In both cases, however, the courts held the employers
liable because supervisors with actual knowledge failed to respond to complaints. 8 ° As in Faragher,a harassment policy's operation, not its text, determines the employer's liability.' An ex...Id at 463, 466.
Id at 467.
760 F Supp at 1512 (criticizing employer's failure to document or otherwise record
complaints of sexual harassment).
164 F3d 534 (10th Cir 1998).
Id at 542.
170 Id at 541.
Id at 542.
178 164 F3d at 543.
Id at 544 (Briscoe concurring) ("we need not address whether [defendant's] sexual
harassment policy was effective"); id (Ebel dissenting) (finding defendant's policy and
procedures adequate).
"SoWilliamson, 148 F3d at 467; Wilson, 164 F3d at 542.
...Compare Faragher,118 S Ct 2275, 2293 (1998) (finding plaintiff and her colleagues
"

to be "completely isolated from the City's higher management") (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted), with Williamson, 148 F3d at 467 (plaintiffs report of sexual
harassment to one named authority constituted notice to the entire organization, despite

policy requesting victims under some circumstances to report harassment to two authorities), and Wilson, 164 F3d at 528, 542 (10th Cir 1998) (employer failed to provide adequate
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pert's assertion that "there should be a number of individuals and
offices specifically identified by name as places where a complaint
concerning sexual harassment could be made"' s would not
change the fact-finder's analysis one iota. Such a generic statement, besides being trite and meaningless, is part of the everyday
life experiences of most jurors, so experts testifying to that effect
would be merely a wasted exercise.
2. Investigative Questions.
The other major category of inquiry under Faragherconcerns
whether an employer adequately investigated claims of sexual
harassment.' Because a number of different parties are involved,' the application of a sexual harassment policy may vary
more from case to case than its mere existence, dissemination,
and bypass procedure. Judges and juries should and do evaluate
the adequacy of investigations without relying on expert witnesses.'85 Allowing expert witnesses to evaluate an employer's
investigation' would be inconsistent with Rule 702's helpfulness
requirement.
The first problem with expert testimony regarding investigations is that such testimony is generally irrelevant. The authors
of a leading book on workplace sexual harassment propose fourteen guidelines that would apply to all investigations, 8 7 but no
court has adopted these or any other categorical recommendations. In Harper v Southeast Alabama Medical Center,1" the
plaintiffs expert stated that "it was inadequate not to interview
other individuals" who, according to the plaintiff, had witnessed

alternate channel when campus police officer to whom victim reported sexual harassment
did not formally notify victim's supervisor of incident).
Harper,998 F Supp at 1297.
Faragherv City of Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2293 (1998) (finding that defendant's officials "made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors").
'" Anne Levy and Michele Paludi, Workplace Sexual Harassment 112-13 (Prentice
Hall 1997) (recommending that an employer should interview the complainant, the person
complained about, and all witnesses whom the complainant identifies).
" See Dunning v Ezell, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 18129, *14 (S D Ala) (finding that employer's internal investigation and remedial action constituted reasonable action as a
matter of law); see also Ponticelli v Zurich American Insurance Group, 16 F Supp 2d 414,
431 (S D NY 1998) (adequacy of defendant's investigation is "a factual dispute").
" Harper v Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 998 F Supp 1289, 1297 (M D Ala
1998); Huffman v City of PrairieVillage, 980 F Supp 1192, 1207 (D Kan 1997); but see
Malik v CarrierCorp, 986 F Supp 86, 96 (D Cann 1997) (rejecting the necessity of expert
testimony to show "the manner in which investigations of claims of sexual harassment
must be conducted").
Levy and Paludi, Workplace Sexual Harassment 112-13 (cited in note 184).
998 F Supp 1289 (M D Ala 1998).
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incidents of harassment.' 9 Certainly it is appropriate to question
the defendant's decision, which was possibly incorrect. But the
question for the jury is whether the defendant's investigation
failed to evince reasonable care in correcting sexual
harassment.19 Under this standard, the trier of fact must evaluate the defendant's reasons for narrowing the scope of an investigation and determine whether these reasons are sufficient for the
employer to avoid vicarious liability. 1 ' How the employer could
have conducted a better investigation - in the absence of countervailing reasons - amounts to a tautology and is simply not
relevant.192

Expert testimony about employer investigations also ignores
a second issue, the employer's incentive to conduct a thorough,
speedy investigation. Plaintiffs recognize the importance of facts
gathered during an internal investigation, and frequently request
disclosure of investigation notes despite the colorable claim that
such notes are protected by the attorney-client privilege.'93 For
many employers, the purpose of a thorough investigation is to
prevent the possibility of litigation.9 4 It only makes sense for an
employer to conduct a sham investigation if the employer is concerned about neither lost productivity nor Title VII liability.
Even when an employer's incentive to conduct a thorough
investigation proves insufficient, courts are able to identify inadequate investigations based on the employer's diligence in pursuing the claim. For example, in Southard v Texas Board of
Criminal Justice,' the Fifth Circuit rejected an expert's testimony that a state agency's investigation procedure was "fatally
' Id at 1297 & n 17 (defendant's human resources director stated that he did not
consider the other persons to be "witnesses").
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293.
In Harper,the district court held that employer was not liable for harassment, but
did not address the adequacy of the investigation. 998 F Supp at 1301-02.
'" See, for example, EEOC v Indiana Bell Telephone Co, Inc, 79 FEP Cases (BNA)
570, 574 (S D Ind 1997) ("The proper inquiry, however, is not what is best, but what is
reasonable under the circumstances.").
"' Harding v Dana Transportation,914 F Supp 1084, 1103 (D NJ 1996) (employer
must disclose facts communicated to an attorney engaged as an investigator); see also
Johnson v Rauland-Borg Corp, 961 F Supp 208, 211 (N D Il 1997) (employer must also
disclose legal advice tendered during investigation). Some courts find that a plaintiff has a
compelling need for notes written during an internal investigation, to impeach witnesses
and reveal bias. Peterson v Wallace Computer Services, Inc, 984 F Supp 821, 826 (D Vt
1997).
1
See generally Nancy E. Pritikin, Roundtable: No Safety From Sex Harassment
Claims But Companies Can Help Themselves With Good Policies, Training, 8 Corp Legal
Times 36 (Sept 1998).
'" 114 F3d 539 (5th Cir 1997).
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flawed."" The court noted that another department conducted
the investigation, that information could be given informally, and
that the employer encouraged and protected witnesses.197 Although the expert in Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc,"ss
did not testify about proper investigative procedures, the court
concluded that the employer's investigation into sexual harassment was seriously deficient. 9 These and other cases reject a
checklist approach to the adequacy of an investigation, and highlight instead evidence of the employer's zeal to investigate and
resolve claims of sexual harassment,"' as well as fact-specific issues such as timeliness.0 1 Refusing to admit expert testimony on
these subjects focuses parties and courts on the essential factual
questions without the gloss of conclusory testimony by experts.
B. Separating Employer From Employee Reasonableness
Expert testimony concerning employer reasonableness initially gained explanatory force by providing evidence that victims
of sexual harassment rarely come forward. 0 However, in establishing an affirmative defense to vicarious liability, the Supreme
Court has divided employer and employee reasonableness into
two separate tests. 203 Proof that an employer has exercised rea-

sonable care in preventing and correcting sexual harassment is
insufficient to prevail on the affirmative defense. A defendant

"
"

Id at 553 n 28.
Id at 553.
760 F Supp 1486 (M D Fla 1991).

"
Id at 1515 (defendant failed to investigate plaintiffs complaints about hostile work
environment caused in part by nude pictures posted in the workplace).
See Cleveland v InternationalPaperCo, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 15557 (N D NY):

[Plaintiff's] criticisms of the pace or thoroughness of the investigation are
irrelevant because there is no dispute that [defendant] was not ignoring
her allegations and was taking action reasonably calculated to stop the
harassment. Although she complains that defendant 'acted unreasonably
by investigating for more than a month without making any conclusions
or recommendations,' [plaintiff] offers no evidence to show that [defendant's] efforts were a sham or a token gesture.
Id at *15 (citation omitted).
"0 Montero v AGCO Corp, 19 F Supp 2d 1143, 1146 (E D Cal 1998) ("Moreover, [defendant] immediately investigated plaintiffs complaints and acted to correct the same.").
Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc, 760 F Supp 1486, 1519 (M D Fla 1991)
("iFlormal complaint is the most rare because the victim of harassment fears an escalation
of the problem, retaliation from the harasser, and embarrassment in the process of reporting.").
2
See note 147 and accompanying text.

612

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:

must show independently that the plaintiffs delay in bringing a
grievance was unreasonable.2 4
To the extent that a plaintiffs failure to take advantage of a
grievance procedure results from psychological or other distress,
expert testimony may be admissible in some circumstances.0 5
There are also broader questions concerning the helpfulness or
admissibility of expert testimony in demonstrating a plaintiffs
reasonableness in hostile workplace environment cases.0 6 However, neither of these issues is connected with an employer's duty
to take reasonable care. Courts should hold that cultural or psychological expert testimony is admissible only with respect to an
employee's failure to take advantage of a harassment policy, and
not to the reasonableness of the employer's policy and grievance
procedure.
The Ellerth and Faragherdecisions represent an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, change in the law of employer liability for sexual harassment. Although harassment policies had
been relevant to employer liability for more than ten years,0 7 the
Supreme Court distinguished employer from employee reasonableness and identified salient facts evincing an employer's reaCourts appear to be divided on how closely they will scrutinize the plaintiffs' reasons for delay. Compare Vandermeer v Douglas County, 15 F Supp 2d 970, 981 (D Nev
1998) (plaintiff's delay in delaying harassment complaint held reasonable as a matter of
law, because plaintiff believed supervisor's superiors already knew about harassment and
plaintiff had been warned not to publicly accuse supervisor of anything), and Corcoran v
Shoney's Colonial, Inc, 24 F Supp 2d 601, 606 (W D Va 1998) (delay of eight months not
unreasonable where "isolated remarks were made and [ Jfor a long period nothing further
occurred"), with Jones v USA Petroleum Corp, 20 F Supp 2d 1379, 1386 (S D Ga 1998)
(failure to report sexual harassment unreasonable where plaintiffs merely made "conclusory assertions that [they] felt they would get into trouble if they reported [supervisor's]
behavior").
See Dang Vang v VangXiongX Toyed, 944 F2d 476, 481-82 (9th Cir 1991) (admitting cultural testimony to explain behavior of sexual assault victims who had continuing
contact with the official who raped them); see also Vansonius and Gould, 50 Baylor L Rev
at 308 (cited in note 72) (describing a plaintiff's use of "sociologists, psychologists, or anthropologists" to explain that "delay in reporting the alleged harassment is consistent with
his or her culture's norms").
'
See note 13. Because this Comment focuses on employer reasonableness, it does
not address whether the "reasonable person" standard should permit greater use of expert
testimony in establishing the plaintiffs prima facie case. For an argument that courts
should permit greater expert testimony in support of plaintiffs' claims, see Note, Where is
the Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for Requiring Expert Testimony in Sexual
HarassmentTrials, 51 Stan L Rev 357, 384 (1999) ("[E]xpert testimony provides the necessary tools for helping lay decisionmakers to understand why a plaintiff may have initially tried to deny, ignore, or cope with the sexually harassing conduct before she expressly or forcefully confronted it.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Comment, Sexual Harassment and Expertise: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
in Cases Utilizing the Reasonable Woman Standard, 35 Santa Clara L Rev 651, 675-76
(1995).
"' See notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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sonableness. Because facts concerning an employer's responsiveness are rarely outside a jury's common understanding, courts
should not permit a party to utilize expert testimony for the purpose of supporting or attacking an employer's affirmative defense
under Ellerth and Faragher.
IV. PRINCIPLES FOR NARROWING THE SCOPE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY CONCERNING HARASSMENT POLICIES

Limiting the scope of admissible expert testimony regarding
employer reasonableness will ensure that expert testimony assists rather than confuses the jury."° The civil jury, rather than
the expert analyst, is the best representative of community sentiment in complex liability cases. Even if jurors do not defer to
expert opinions, the experts' concepts of "adequacy" and "inadequacy" improperly frame the debate over liability and are misleading.2" 9 Useful expert testimony must focus the jury and the
parties on the employer's willingness to alter its day-to-day behavior to deter sexual harassment,2 10 rather than substitute for
the jury's judgment.
A. Assistance or Confusion?
Because an employer's post-Ellerth affirmative defense relies
primarily on facts evincing reasonableness, eliminating the use of
expert testimony on this issue preserves the, jury's role as the
finder of ultimate fact. The jury, rather than the expert, represents the common sense of the community.2 Furthermore, the
jury functions to change norms, not merely to reflect the status
quo.212 In the hard cases concerning the scope of employer liability
under Title VII, jurors should be permitted to arrive at moral arguments honestly, without encountering a "mystifying cloud of
words"21 ' from an expert.

See Part I C 2.
See Part IV A.
210

See Part V B.

.. See notes 215-17 and accompanying text; see also EEOC v IndianaBell Telephone
Co, 79 FEP Cases (BNA) 570, 574 (S D Ind 1997) (defendant's conduct "is subject to a
reasonableness determination and hindsight evaluation by a panel of impartial jurors").
2' See notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
Benjamin Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do For Law, in Law and Literature and
213
OtherEssays and Addresses 100 (Harcourt, Brace 1931).
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1. What the Jury Needs.
To understand the relationship between the expert witness
and the jury, it is important first to understand the civil jury's
function as an embodiment of "common sense." Although Justice
Holmes once envisioned a growing sphere of matters in which
judges, rather than juries, would better "represent the common
sense of the community,"214 the jury's importance has persisted,
especially in determining what constitutes sexual harassment.215
The prominence of juries in federal anti-discrimination law
suggests that Congress does not intend to cede liability and damages decisions to panels of experts. The 1991 Amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically created a right to a jury trial
for victims of sexual harassment.21 Legislators effected this
change in the law despite opposition from those who feared that
an expansion of Title VII's remedial scheme would "cause juries
to award damages vastly disproportionate to the offeses [sic]
committed by the defendant."217
The liability issues at stake in sexual harassment trials are
conducive to jury decision-making. As an initial matter, few sexual harassment cases proceed to trial, and even fewer to a jury
trial.21 s Therefore the issues presented in a jury trial may fall
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 124 (Little, Brown, 1923). The case
of Lorenzo v Wirth, 49 NE 1010 (Mass 1898), pointedly illustrates the contrast on this
issue between Holmes and his critics. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, found the
defendant not liable as a matter of law for plaintiff's injuries, which she sustained when
she walked on a paved surface outside her building and stepped into a coal hole. Id at
1011 ("A heap of coal on a sidewalk in Boston is an indication, according to common experience, that there may very possibly be a coal hole to receive it."). A dissenting Justice
argued that the case was sufficiently complex to submit to the jury. Id at 1012 (Knowlton
dissenting) (I think that the jury might well have found that a coal hole on a public sidewalk... was left open on a dark evening ... with nothing to indicate to pedestrians that
there was an opening there, and [ nobody to guard the hole or to warn them of danger.").
"ll See Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 24 (1993) (Scalia concurring)
("[T]oday's holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to warrant an award of damages."); see also note 241.
"1 "Ifa complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section
... any party may demand a trial by jury." 42 USC § 1981a(c) (1994).
217
Civil Rights & Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991, HR Rep No 102-40(I),
102d Cong, 1st Sess 72 (1991).
21
See generally Ramon Coronado, Man Gets $1 Million in Harass Lawsuit: Nurse's
Employer to Pay in Same-Sex Settlement, Sacramento Bee B1 (June 19, 1998) (an employment lawyer stated that "[o]nly about 2 percent of sexual harassment cases make it to
trial, and those that do rarely reach a jury"); John Accola, Most Disputes Never Reach
Court, Rocky Mountain News 8B (Mar 30, 1999) (reporting that an employment lawyer
litigated only 2 of approximately 300 sexual harassment disputes before a jury); John
Accola, Deals in the Dark: ColoradoEmployers Rapidly Settling Lawsuits in Secret, Rocky
Mountain News 1G (Mar 28, 1999) (reporting that of 108 sexual harassment suits filed in
21
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closer to the boundary of whether an employer has acted reasonably. Important facts may support neither or both parties.
Courts should be wary of attempts to use expert testimony to
limit the jury's exercise of common sense in fixing liability in difficult cases. The Supreme Court's skepticism about sexual stereotyping testimony in Price Waterhouse v Hopkins219 is particularly
appropriate here. As the Court said, "It takes no special training
to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring 'a course at charm school."'22
2. How the Expert Should Testify.
Experts should be allowed to testify on underlying facts, but
never about reasonableness. Otherwise the jury would be
tempted to substitute the expert's advice for their own judgment,
preventing the jury from exercising its role as representative of
the community. Even if the average juror knows little about the
functioning of a sexual harassment policy and grievance procedure, it is doubtful that conclusory expert opinions about a policy's adequacy satisfy Rule 702's assistance requirement.221 Some
experts know nothing about the parties, but only testify about the
language of the employer's policy.222 Such testimony is hardly distinguishable from "tell[ing] the jury what result to reach."22
When expert opinion does not examine the facts of whether an
employee knew about an employer's harassment policy, and how
promptly and thoroughly the employer conducted an investigation, a conclusion as to "reasonableness" or "adequacy" is simply
not relevant to liability.224 An expert who wants to provide real
assistance to the jury must address facts of policy dissemination
and complaint investigation.
Experts in many fields can assist a jury by testifying about
facts other than scientific cause, such as modus operandi or custom. The Sixth Circuit provides the useful example of a beekeeper testifying from experience that bumblebees always take

one federal district court in 1997, 93 were settled, dismissed, or resolved prior to trial, and
only one had gone to trial).
219 490 US 228 (1989) (plurality opinion); see notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
490 US at 256.
"'
See notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
See note 113.
FRE 704 Advisory Committee Notes; see also part I C 2.
"
EEOC v IndianaBell Telephone Co, 79 FEP Cases (BNA) 570, 574 (S D Ind 1997)
("Reasonableness will vary with the set of circumstances facing the employer. Nothing in
[the expert's] testimony connects her prior experience or knowledge to the facts and circumstances facing [defendant].").
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off in the direction of the wind.225 The government uses a variant
of this testimony in drug prosecutions, when experts testify that
traffickers do not use "unknowing transporters."226 Expert witnesses in sexual harassment cases might evaluate employer
trends. An expert should be permitted to state what percentage of
Fortune 500 companies have a written sexual harassment policy,
describe how these companies disseminate information to employees, and compare and contrast different methods of investigating harassment allegations. Such testimony may be reliable
and in certain circumstances fit the facts of the case, 227 but it does

not qualify the expert to assess whether an employer's attempt to
prevent and correct harassment was reasonable. Concluding from
an industry trend that a specific employer was reasonable would
be like asking a beekeeper not why bumblebees take off into the
wind, but why one particular bee flies slower than another.
An expert testifying about employer reasonableness, even
when she discusses how a harassment policy and grievance system work, must of course explain how these facts bear on an employer's liability. 228 Not only must an expert tell the jury something it does not already know, 229 but the basis for the testimony
must also "fit" the circumstances in the individual case. 2 ' As the

Supreme Court stated in Daubert, "validity for one purpose is not
necessarily []validity for other, unrelated purposes."2 1 Consider,
for example, a survey of how employers conduct investigations. If
an expert intends to testify that only 5 percent of Fortune 500
employers require the victim to submit a written complaint, this
information is potentially useful. But if the parties to the lawsuit
agree that the employer began an internal investigation immediately after the victim submitted a written complaint, there is no
nexus between this facet of the grievance procedure and the employer's response. This testimony would not fit the facts of the
case, and should be excluded.

See note 46.
United States v Cordoba, 104 F3d 225, 229 (9th Cir 1997).
"7
But see Indiana Bell, 79 FEP Cases at 574-75 (excluding expert testimony that
purported to summarize "best practices" in implementing sexual harassment policies).
See notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical ConsiderationsRegarding Expert
Testimony, 15 Harv L Rev 40, 54 (1901) (expert testimony is "foreign in kind" from the
experience of a jury).
' See United States v Downing, 753 F2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir 1985) (finding possible
lack of fit when expert's experimental methodology did not duplicate circumstances for
which testimony was offered).
" 509 US at 591.
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Permitting expert testimony generally about what employer
responses are reasonable runs the further risk of confusing the
jury regarding the underlying issue of an employer's liability.
One justification for the Daubert factors is the potential for juries
to be swayed by expert opinion in the guise of science.232 Some
scholars argue that juries automatically discount the value of
non-scientific or non-technical expert testimony, 3 and suggest
that the Daubert test should not be applied rigorously to nonscientific testimony.234 However, other research on jury behavior
has suggested that jurors often do not draw credibility distinctions between scientific and non-scientific expert testimony. 5 If
the latter study more accurately describes the average jury, juries
may overestimate the value of expert testimony concerning employer reasonableness. Limiting expert testimony to the facts
surrounding an employer's harassment policy and procedures rather than allowing general opinions as to "reasonableness" will prevent the jury from deferring to experts on the community's standard for employer liability.
3. What Title VII's Goals Suggest.
Expert testimony regarding employer reasonableness also
undermines the legitimacy of juries to punish employer behavior
that transgresses community norms. One important feature of
the civil jury is its role as a "catalyst of change," particularly on
questions involving complex value judgments.23 This is not to
Id at 595 (citing risk of 'prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury')
(citation omitted).
See, for example, Neil Vidmar, The Performanceof the American Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 Ariz L Rev 849, 863-64 (summarizing research suggesting that jurors
are not unduly influenced by expert testimony). One study found that in four complex
trials, one of which was a sexual harassment case, jurors were not impressed with the
experts, and dismissed them as "hired guns." Special Committee on Jury Comprehension,
Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases 29-31 (ABA 1990).
' Professor Vidmar and others filed a brief amici curiae in the United States Supreme Court on behalf of the respondents in Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael.The amid took
no position on the applicability of Daubert to non-scientific testimony, but argued that the
empirical evidence belied that claim that juries defer to experts. See Brief of Neil Vidmar,
et al, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 119 S
Ct 1167 (1999), available at 1998 WL 734434 ("We enter this case to assist the Court with
a candid presentation of what social science evidence tells us about how juries respond to
expert evidence.").
' Daniel W. Shuman, Anthony Champagne, and Elizabeth Whitaker, JurorAssessments of the Believability of Expert Witnesses: A Literature Review, 36 Jurimetrics J 371,
382 (1996) (questioning the assumption that juries treat "hard" and "soft" scientific testimony differently, especially when "[t]he typical juror forms impressions of experts stereotypically ... based on the personal characteristics of the experts").
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 Va L Rev 1055, 1071 (1964).
For a critique of Kalven's view of the jury's ability to "defin[e] liability and evaluat[e]

618

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:

deny that experts, scientific or otherwise, can also be catalysts for
change. But expert testimony focusing entirely on the language in
policies and procedures undermines the civil jury's legitimacy, by
encouraging employers to manipulate the incentive structure
outlined in Faragher"7 Vicarious employer liability will not work
if the employer can prevail too easily on its affirmative defense.
For example, an employer might fail to respond to complaints of
sexual harassment if it could encourage a jury to defer to a defense expert and thus win the lawsuit. A strongly-worded but
never-enforced sexual harassment policy might also defeat liability if plaintiffs do not hire an expert witness to counter the employer's expert.238
Generalized expert testimony about employer reasonableness
may inhibit honest resolution of lay persons' disagreements. Jurors likely will disagree about whether an employer must do more
(or less) to prevent sexual harassment. The appropriate question
is not whether the employer's system for preventing and correcting harassment caused the plaintiffs harm, but rather whether it
did what was necessary to avoid the harm.239 When an employer's
harassment procedures fall on the borderline of reasonableness,
jury verdicts may indeed be inconsistent. 240 But at bottom, a

jury's verdict on an employer's liability for sexual harassment is
damages in contexts implicating complex or conflicting societal values," see George L.
Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U Chi Legal F
161, 170, 172-81.
7 Faragherv City of Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2292 (1998) ("It would therefore
implement clear statutory policy and complement the Government's Title VII enforcement
efforts to recognize the employer's affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give
credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty.").
' See Butta-Brinkman v FCA International,Ltd, 950 F Supp 230, 233 (N D Ill 1996)
(granting summary judgment for defendant whose employee relations expert testified that
defendant "has a clear specific policy against sexual harassment" and employees "have
every reason to expect a prompt, thorough investigation, and prompt, effective remedial
action when they bring forward a complaint of harassment") (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Carriganv Delaware Dept of Corrections, 957 F Supp 1376, 1383 (D Del
1997) (granting summary judgment for prison in § 1983 sexual harassment suit by inmate, where plaintiff did not rebut defense expert's opinion that training, policy, procedures and supervision were 'more than adequate').
' Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293 (employer satisfies first element of affirmative defense
by "exercis[ing] reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior").
"o
See Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 63 (Norton 1978):
[11f a series of juries is viewed as representative, then the pattern of decisions which emerges from that series can also be taken to reflect the values of the community. Similarly, the lack of a pattern may be viewed as
reflecting values so sensitive to the nuances of slightly varying facts, or
in such flux, as to disrupt any discernible pattern.
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in many respects a moral judgment.2 41 From this perspective, an
expert may confuse the jury into thinking that this moral question is instead technical. Limiting expert testimony to facts about
harassment policies thus allows juries to decide where a particular employer fits on the continuum of responses to sexual harassment. Testimony on trends may better inform juries as to
when an employer is clearly behind the curve in implementing its
sexual harassment policy, but will not tell juries that a certain
policy amounts to automatic liability or an automatic defense.
The wide range of admissible expert testimony regarding
employer responses to sexual harassment also prevents the
shaping of norms in the outside world. When experts recast the
issue of an employer's reasonableness as the "adequacy" of a harassment policy, they may mislead the jury into thinking that its
liability decision is not an evaluative judgment. 2 Conduct that
employers or even jurors perceive to have been acceptable in the
past may now be questionable or unacceptable. Juries are the
ideal instrument for deciding where to place the line: although
experts write and think about these issues frequently, deferring
to them concerning the effectiveness of harassment policies assumes erroneously that experts have a moral sense superior to
that of lay jurors. For a dialogue concerning the limits of liability
to be successful, lay opinions on fault rather than expert opinions
on "adequacy" must be controlling.2 4
There is reason for concern about the over-reliance on community norms, especially when a hostile jury might ignore the
legitimate claims of an employee or unfairly hold individual employers liable. However, using experts to suppress these debates
does not achieve more impartial justice. Instead, such practices
may cloak evaluative judgments about an employer's duty to prevent harassment. If post-Robinson expert testimony on employer
responses to harassment leads to juror deference in determining

See, for example, Gallagherv Delaney, 139 F2d 338, 342 (2d Cir 1998) (M[A] jury
made up of a cross-section of our heterogenous communities provides the appropriate
institution for deciding whether borderline situations should be characterized as sexual

harassment.").
2 See, for example, EEOC v Indiana Bell Telephone Co, 79 FEP Cases (BNA) 570,
574 (S D Ind 1997) (defendant's conduct "is subject to a reasonableness determination and
hindsight evaluation by a panel of impartial jurors").
'"
See notes 237-38 and accompanying text; see also Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance Of
Law Is An Excuse - But Only For The Virtuous, 96 Mich L Rev 127, 154 (1997) (arguing
that doctrines in criminal law such as the mistake of fact defense actually prevent legitimate discussion of issues on the moral boundary).
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Title VII liability, then this testimony can be characterized by
Justice Cardozo's phrase, "a mystifying cloud of words."2 "
B. Illusory Benefits to Litigants
Expert testimony about employer reasonableness fails to encourage out-of-court settlements of sexual harassment complaints. The Court in Faragherv City of Boca Raton245 referred to
employers' affirmative defense as an "incentive" to discharge
their duty to prevent sexual harassment of employees.248 Expert
testimony, however, upsets the incentive structure in two ways.
First, if employers can use expert testimony to declare policies
and investigations "reasonable" in order to prevail on summary
judgment or before a jury, they will have fewer incentives to reshape their day-to-day practices in order to reduce incidents of
sexual harassment. 7
Second, and conversely, even if the facts of an employer's investigation suggest that the employer took significant action to
prevent and correct harassment, expert testimony may undervalue the peculiarities of the investigation relative to the written
words of the sexual harassment policy. An expert for the plaintiff
could criticize the defendant's policy based on a superficial analysis of its terms, 248 and persuade the jury to ignore the facts and

find the defendant liable. Although this criticism is not unique to
sexual harassment cases, the non-scientific nature of such testimony makes judicial screening more important. 49 If the employer
wins or loses without regard to its policy, it will not bother to improve its written policy. Similarly, if it wins or loses regardless
of
250
its actions, it will not bother to better implement its policy.
Employers would have a more powerful incentive to improve
their harassment policies and modify their employees' behavior if
they could prove reasonableness solely through the facts of policy
dissemination and investigation. Juries' decisions could begin to
mark out an area within which employer behavior is deemed
adequate to avoid liability. Most employers will have the incenCardozo, What Medicine Can Do For Law at 100 (cited in note 213).
118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
21

Id at 2292.

See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 602-03 (Aspen 5th ed 1998)
(erroneous judicial determinations in the defendant's favor lead to fewer precautions by
defendant and a net social loss).
247

',
','

See Part II C.

See notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 603 (cited in note 247).
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tive to alter their day-to-day practices to the most stringent end
of this range of reasonable behavior and avail themselves of the
powerful affirmative defense.25 ' Even though the cost of precautions will increase, the employer will have a net gain because it
will not be held liable if it prevails on the affirmative defense.
Thus, modifying employment policies and conducting thorough
investigations of sexual harassment will be cheaper than guessing wrong and being held liable for sexual harassment.
Proponents of expert testimony in sexual harassment cases
frequently argue that plaintiffs need this testimony. 2 Nevertheless, recent changes in the law will increasingly encourage employers to use expert testimony to defend their harassment policies and procedures. Under Faragherand Burlington Industries,
253 the employer rather
Inc v Ellerth,
than the employee bears the
burden of proof that its policies and procedures adequately prevented and corrected sexual harassment.2 " Furthermore, even if
an employer is found liable, it may still use the affirmative defense to reduce the amount of damages a plaintiff is awarded. 55
Thus, it is likely that employers, not victims of sexual harassment, will benefit most from liberal admissibility of expert testimony on this subject. The overall purpose of Title VII to protect
employees, coupled with the possibly misleading nature of expert
testimony, means that expert testimony on behalf of the defendant should be viewed more skeptically then ever.
A related argument in favor of expert testimony is that in an
adversary system of civil litigation, courts should not preclude
parties from utilizing expert witnesses,5 ' regardless of distribu" Id at 196 (arguing that the probability that even a careful defendant will cause an
accident causes it to incur greater expenses to take care).
' See, for example, Mulligan, et al, Expert Witnesses § 23.1 at 320 (cited in note 9)
(arguing that experts are needed to "document to the trier of fact the importance of the
various kinds of harassment in causing the injuries alleged"); see also Comment, 35 Santa

Clara L Rev at 675-76 (cited in note 206).
118 S Ct 2257 (1998).
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293. This analysis assumes that
the plaintiff can satisfy the prima facie case for a hostile environment. See Meritor Sav-

ings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 67 (1986) (adopting "severe or pervasive" standard
for hostile work environment claims). Of course if a plaintiff cannot meet this burden, the
defendant need not raise the affirmative defense.

Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293.
For an argument that jurors are perhaps as capable as judges in screening out poor
expert testimony, see Vidmar, 40 Ariz L Rev at 863-66 (cited in note 233); see also Dau-

bert v Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc, 509 US 579, 596 ("Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."). For a
contrasting view, see L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29
U Richmond L Rev 1389, 1455 (1995) (arguing that the adversary system fails to effec-
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tional and normative effects. This argument is erroneous for several reasons. First, the trial court -

not the parties -

decides

whether an expert witness can assist the trier of fact.257 Second,
the "battle of the experts" phenomenon degrades juror perceptions of the validity of the expert opinion."' This argument has
greater force when non-scientific testimony is at issue, and the
trial court's balancing of probative value against prejudice has
fewer guideposts.259 Third, greater use of experts to assess employer reasonableness will lead defendants to incur greater expert costs in litigation.
Some plaintiffs and some defendants may win individual
cases on the basis of expert testimony, but making such testimony outcome-determinative does not further the remedial and
conciliatory purposes of Title VII.2 0 When Congress amended Title VII in 1991, it clearly intended to maintain the pre-litigation
goals of mediation and internal dispute resolution, even while
moving to a system of fee-shifting and recovery of expert costs.2"'
It would be ironic if allowing the increased use of experts on employer reasonableness undermines the first goal in pursuit of the
second.
CONCLUSION

This Comment advocates a judge-based solution to the problem of increasingly diffuse and intangible expert testimony critiquing employer reasonableness. For employers, whether or not
courts exclude this expert testimony will not determine the success of their affirmative defense. The employer must still prove
that the plaintiff behaved "unreasonably" by failing to take advantage of a grievance procedure. Further, no affirmative defense

tively "root out marginal expert testimony"); see also John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U Chi L Rev 823, 841 (1985) (arguing that adversary
theory is inappropriate in the fact-gathering stage of civil litigation).
"7
See notes 28-30 and accompanying text.

Shuman, Champagne, and Whitaker, 36 Jurimetrics J at 382 (cited in note 235)
("In many instances, jurors spontaneously told the interviewers that experts are chosen to
testify because their opinions favor the party that calls them.").
' Perrin, 29 U Richmond L Rev at 1455 (cited in note 256).

' See Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2292 (noting that Title VII's 'primary objective'.., is
not to provide redress but avoid harm"), quoting Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US
405, 417 (1975).
"' HR Rep No 102-40(I) at 73 (cited in note 217) (Congress intended neither to "'jettison' nor 'scuttle' any of the statute's existing remedial or conciliation procedures" in permitting compensatory and punitive damage awards).
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is available if the allegedly harassing environment led to a tangible employment action.262
Limiting expert testimony to industry trends and descriptive
information that jurors do not normally possess will have the
positive effect of giving employers incentive to focus on the dayto-day facts of how they implement policies and investigate complaints of harassment. As demonstrated by the lower court decisions following Ellerth and Faragher,these threshold facts often
determine whether courts will hold an employer vicariously liable
for a supervisor's harassment of a subordinate.
For employees, refusing to admit expert testimony on employer reasonableness appears to eliminate a useful litigation
strategy. However, recent examples of expert testimony on harassment policies indicate too much reliance on abstract notions of
adequate and inadequate policies. Furthermore, Ellerth and
Faragherhave changed the structure of sexual harassment cases
to make this type of expert testimony less probative. Not only
does the employer bear the burden of proving that its grievance
procedure and investigation were reasonably calculated to end
harassment, the plaintiffs failure to invoke the grievance procedure need only be reasonable in order to defeat the affirmative
defense.2"
In limited circumstances, expert testimony may nonetheless
assist jurors in determining employer liability for sexual harassment. Descriptive testimony would be useful to fill in gaps in the
layperson's knowledge. For example, an expert might define the
purpose or use of a sexual harassment policy. The expert might
also compare and contrast different methods of investigating sexual harassment policies. But when an expert suggests that one
method is clearly adequate or inadequate, the judge should rule
this conclusion impermissible because it is neither reliable nor
sufficiently grounded in the facts of the case.
Under this approach, district courts should exercise their
gatekeeping function more vigorously regarding expert testimony
on employer reasonableness. Both parties would be forced to try
issues of employer reasonableness on the facts. Not only does a
stronger judicial role in screening this expert testimony help jurors make better normative judgments, it also helps employers
understand that they cannot discharge their liability for supervisor harassment merely by hiring an expert.
See note 148 and accompanying text.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293.

